
Jonathan Waskan
The potential of artificial
intelligence has
always been tempered
by the limits of computation,
a notion that dates back at
least to the 1930s work of
Alan Turing and his famous
thought experiment that gave
us the abstract Turing
machines.
Jonathan Waskan is a
professor of philosophy - and the Beckman
Institute's lone philosopher - but his perspective
on the computational issues surrounding
artificial intelligence (AI) is something
computer scientists, cognitive scientists,
and AI researchers may want to consider.
Waskan is an Assistant Professor of
Philosophy at the University of Illinois and
a member of the Cognitive Science group at
the Beckman Institute. Some may not know,
or think it unusual, that Beckman has a
philosopher as one of its faculty members.
But Waskan's Ph.D. from a unique program
at Washington University in St. Louis that
combines philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology
attests to his interdisciplinary credentials.
At Illinois his work focuses on the
philosophy of cognitive science, including
issues that apply to artificial intelligence.
In his writings, especially in his 2006
book Models and Cognition (MIT Press),
Waskan delves into the intersection of philosophy,
neuroscience, and artificial intelligence.
He says that the logic metaphor in
philosophy is a proposal stating that "the
way we reason is very similar to what we do
when we construct formal logic proofs" i.e.,
deducing conclusions from propositions, and
that the metaphor also applies to the workings
of computers.
"One of the nice things about computers
is that they are able to implement that kind
of process, to mechanize that sort of formal
reasoning," Waskan said.
"I was interested in the intersection of
philosophy and the cognitive sciences
because it seemed like a lot of the questions
they were asking (in philosophy)
could possibly be answered with cognitive
science." - Jonathan Waskan
Creating a truly effective artificial intelligence
system supported by logic-based
computing, however, runs into problems
that Waskan says are probably
"insurmountable." He offers a different
approach - one that looks to the kind of
computer models used by hurricane predictors
and systems designers.
Turing, working in 1936 before the
advent of the modern computer, explored
the limits of computation through abstract
computational devices known as Turing
machines. The Turing machines could be
used to simulate the logic of computers;
these mathematical abstractions later provided
clues for computer scientists who,
equipped with newer algorithms and everincreasing
processing power, started to contemplate
the possibility of creating artificial
intelligence systems.
"In the early days of artificial intelligence,
a lot of work was being done trying to
figure out how we could use this fact about
computers to model human cognition,"
Waskan said. "People were trying to get systems
to engage in simple, practical reasoning
in real-world environments. Like if a
system wants a glass of water you want it to
be able to figure out, for example, a situation
where it can get a glass of water in its claw,
or whatever. You have to give the system a
bunch of rules and each of these rules has to
have a huge number of qualifications."
As Waskan wrote in Models and
Cognition, the huge number of qualifications
needed in order to compute all the variables
involved in a potential task make the qualification
problem an overwhelming one for
logic-based AI systems: "... in order to
embody what we know about the consequences
of alterations to the world, not only
would an infinite number of rules be
required, but each rule would also have to
be qualified in a seemingly infinite number
of ways."
The qualification problem is but one part
of an overall difficulty in getting a logicbased
system to respond to all the possible
alterations to a situation.
"It's impossible to give a rule-based system,
a logic-based system all of the knowledge
that we have about alterations,"
Waskan said.
This is what is known as the "frame
problem" which has been defined as "the
challenge of getting a representational system
to predict what will change and what
will stay the same following alterations to
the state of the world" (Bechtel,
Abrahamsen & Graham 1998).